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INTRODUCTION

J.R. was a sixteen-year-old eighth-grade student who attended
Atlanta Public Schools.' Mter she spent a brief period in juvenile
detention, Atlanta Public Schools forced J.R. to attend Forrest Hill
Academy,' a taxpayer-funded disciplinary alternative school." Unlike traditional public schools, Forrest Hill Academy was privately
operated by the for-profit corporation, Community Education Partners (CEP).' CEP entered a contractual relationship with Atlanta
Independent School System (AISS) in 2002, agreeing to run a disciplinary alternative school for middle and high school students,
including J.R., who attend Atlanta Public Schools.•
When J.R. attempted to return to her traditional public school,
the school threatened her with criminal trespassing and insisted
J.R. attend Forrest Hill Academy." The school transferred J.R. to the
disciplinary alternative school without notice or hearing. 7 While enrolled in the alternative school, several students physically assaulted J.R. 8 Because she was pregnant and could not defend herself
from the assaults, J.R. requested placement in a different classroom
away from her attackers.• Forrest Hill Academy ignored her
requests, so J.R. stopped attending the school out of fear for her
1. Verified Second Amended Complaint at 11, Harris v. Atlanta lndep. Sch. Sys., No.
1:08-cv-1435-BBM (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint].
2. InApril2021, the Atlanta City School Board renamed Forrest Hill Academy to remove

the school's reference to Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Neil Vigdor, Hank
Aaron's Name Will Replace a Confederate General's on an Atlanta Sclwol, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021104/13/uslh.ank-aaron-high-school-atlanta.html [https:/1
perma.cc/HEZ7-7VC5]. The school is now named the Henry Louis j'Hank" Aaron New Beginnings Academy. Id. However, for clarity, this Note refers to the school as it was named at the

time of J.R.'s Complaint.
3. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 12, 30.
4. Rachel Garver, Atlanta Public Schools Ends Relationship with Private Contractor,
Community Education Partners, Under ACLU Pressure, ACLU (July 30, 2009, 1:01 PM),

https://www.aclu.org/bloglsmart-justice/mass-incarcerationlatlanta-public-schools-endsrelationship-private-contractor [https://perma.cc!F5BP-QRDZ].
5. ld.
6. Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
7. ld.
8. ld.
9. ld. at 13.
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safety. 10 Mter the birth of her child, J.R. tried to return to her
traditional school, but the school again referred J.R. to Forrest Hill
Academy without any opportunity for a hearing. 11 While attending
the alternative school, Forrest Hill Academy subjected J .R. to daily
searches, which included frisking underneath her shirt, around her
bra, inside her waistband, and in her hair and mouth. 12
J.R. is one of the hundreds of Atlanta students who are transferred to disciplinary alternative schools without due process or notice
annually. 13 These schools often feature strict zero-tolerance disciplinary standards and serve as a major step in the school-to-prison
pipeline for students from low-income backgrounds, students with
disabilities, and Black and Brown students. 14 In 2008, the ACLU
filed a class action lawsuit against Forrest Hill Academy on behalf
of eight students; the case settled on December 14, 2009. 15 The
ACLU asserted that Forrest Hili Academy could hardly be described
as a schooL'" "[I]ts students are treated like criminals-it is nothing
more than a warehouse largely for poor children of color."17
The term "alternative school" is used to describe three types of
public schools that differ from traditional institutions.'" These types
are: (1) schools that offer individualized or accelerated class credit
recovery on a full- or part-time basis; (2) schools designated for
students with disruptive or challenging behaviors; and (3) schools
designed for students with disabilities under the Individuals with
10. Id.
11. Id. at 12.
12. ld. at 13; see also Garver, supra note 4.

13. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 27 ("At any point in time, hundreds of students are
enrolled at [Forrest Hill Academy] and the AISS-CEP Contract contemplates an enrollment
of 750 students. The average enrollment at the School is 450 students.").
14. See Miranda Johnson & James Naughton, Just Another School?: The Need to

Strengthen Legal Protections for Students Facing Disciplinary Transfers, 33 NOTREDAMEJ.L.
Pull. POL'y 69, 73-75, 77, 100 (2019).
15. See Harris eta!. v. Atlanta Independent School System, ACLU (Dec. 18, 2009) (here·
inafter ACLU, Harris], https:l/www.aclu.org/caseslharris-et-al-v-atlanta-independent-schoolsystem (https://perma.cc/UQ2P·3U3K].
16. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues over Failed Privately-Run Alternative School
in Atlanta (Mar. 11, 2008) (hereinafter ACLU, Press Release], https://www.aclu.org/pressETHICS &

releases/aclu-sues-over-failed-privately-run-altemative-school-atlanta [https://perma.ce/2W

8C·TC7F).
17. Id.
18. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 70.
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Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 19 This Note focuses on the second
category of alternative schools, also known as disciplinary alterna·
tive schools, where students are involuntarily transferred for a man·
datory period of time as a form of punishment for their in-school
behavior. 20
Disciplinary alternative schools lurk in the shadows of public
systems nationwide. They are almost always located at a separate
school facility, operated by a separate staff, and vary drastically
from their traditional public school counterparts. 21 Like traditional
public schools, alternative schools are taxpayer funded. 22 Some alternative schools remain publicly operated by the local school district, while others are privately operated by for-profit companies. 23
Forrest Hill Academy is one of many publicly funded, privately
operated disciplinary alternative schools that plague inner cities
across the nation. 24 Atlanta paid almost seven million dollars
annually to run the alternative school, yet it was "among the most
dangerous and lowest performing schools in Georgia." 25 During
AISS-CEP's partnership with Atlanta Public Schools, Georgia
taxpayers paid the for-profit corporation a whopping $36,570,941. 26
Public school students were forced into the alternative school
without procedural protections such as notice or opportunities for
hearings. 27 "[T]he placement process is often arbitrary and students
who do not belong at AISS-CEP are given few meaningful opportunities to challenge compulsory assignment to the school." 28
CEP boasts a similarly poor educational record in its alternative
schools in Houston, Philadelphia, Richmond, Orlando, and Florida's Pinnellas and Bay districts, yet in 2005 alone, CEP accrued an
Id.
See id.
See id. at 93.
See id. at 76.
23. Seeid.
19.
20.
21.
22.

24. See id. at 7 4; Areto A Imoukhuede, The Right to Public Education and the School to
Prison Pipeline, 12 ALBANY Gov'T L. REV. 52, 79-30 (2018).
25. See ACLU, Harris, supra note 15.
26. See id. This partnership started in 2002 and ended in 2009 under the pressure of the

ACLU's lawsuit, whichforcedAISS to begin acting as the sole administrator ofthe alternative
school program. See Garver, supra note 4.
27. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 59.
28. ACLU, Harris, supra note 15.
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annual revenue of $70 million.•• In these alternative schools, violence runs rampant, the quality of education is low, and students
are often subjected to daily stop-and-frisk policies."" The schools act
as a funnel into the school-to-prison pipeline for students from lowincome backgrounds, students with disabilities, and Black and
Brown students."1 For example, within the entire Atlanta Public
Schools system, Forrest Hill Academy accounted for over 67 percent
of all reported batteries, 46 percent of all reported vandalisms, and
20 percent of all reported incidents of gun possession."'
The high rates of juvenile and criminal justice referrals often
work in tandem with the underperforming and under-resourced
alternative school curriculum. In the 2007-08 school year, 93 percent of students at Forrest Hill Academy did not meet grade-level
competency in math, and 95 percent did not meet grade-level competency in science."3 Less than 23 percent of students met or exceeded state standards in all subjects. 84 In 2006, not a single student
made it to senior year."5 This underperformance may be attributed
to the lack of resources, functional curriculum, and teacher experience. In 2006-07, "teachers at [Forrest Hill Academy] averaged only
0.94 years of experience compared to teachers in other local
alternative schools, who averaged 19.07 years and 10.58 years,
respectively." 86 Furthermore, unlike its public school counterparts,
the disciplinary alternative school assigns no homework and offers
no library, cafeteria, or gym."7

29. Seeid.
30. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, at 4, 13-14, 36, 42 ("Police officers posted to the
School and under Defendants' supervision have hit at least one child on the leg with a police
baton and threw another against a wall. Another student was struck on the back of the neck
and dragged across the floor by a teacher. Upon information and belief, none of the staff
involved in these incidents was investigated, disciplined, subjected to future monitoring, or
given training on how to avoid physical confrontations with students.").
31. See Imoukhuede, supra note 24, at 69; Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 74.
32. ACLU, Press Release, supra note 16.
33. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. "[N]o functional curriculum exists at the school and
teachers spend little time instructing students. Rather, students spend most of the day fliling
out worksheets, for which they receive no feedback." ACLU, Press Release, supra note 16.
34. ACLU, Press Release, supra note 16.
35. ld.
36. ld.
37. Id.
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Circuits are split on whether students are entitled to procedural
protections before school officials may force them into alternative
schools."8 This Note argues that students facing an involuntary
transfer to a disciplinary alternative school are entitled to procedural protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part I explains the trend toward the use of disciplinary
alternative schools and the social and educational harms that these
schools exacerbate. Part II explores the current circuit split around
the procedural due process rights of students facing involuntary
transfer to an alternative school. Part III argues that courts should
expand the Supreme Court's holding in Goss v. Lopez to ensure students receive due process protections before being involuntarily
transferred to disciplinary alternative schools. Part IV addresses
counterarguments and concludes that, by extending procedural protections to students facing involuntary alternative school transfers,
courts can protect those most vulnerable from harmful disciplinary
actions.
I. BACKGROUND

The evolution of alternative schools has resulted in low-quality
facilities with low disciplinary thresholds and zero-tolerance standards."" Modern alternative schools serve a punitive goal, rather
than providing the student opportunities for rehabilitation, and
their disproportionate effect on certain student groups exacerbates
this harm. 40 Black and Brown, poor, and disabled students constitute a significant portion of the student body at alternative schools
and remain at greater risk of transfer after minor disciplinary
38. Compare Langley v. Monroe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 264 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2008),
Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1997), Zamora
v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d662, 670 (lOth Cir.1981), and Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352,
1359 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that students are not entitled to due process before facing an
involuntarily transfer to a disciplinary alternative school), with Betts v. Bd. ofEduc., 466 F.2d
629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972), and Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(holding that students are entitled to procedural protections because transferring a student

to disciplinary alternative school is comparable to suspension or expulsion).
39. See India Geronimo, Deconstructing the Marginalization of ''Underclass" Students:
Disciplinary Alternative Education, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 429, 434, 444-45 (2011).
40. See id. at 434-35.
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infractions. 41 Once transferred to an alternative school, students'
odds of becoming involved in the criminal justice or juvenile justice
systems increase. 42 Section A of this Part discusses the history and
evolution of disciplinary alternative schools. Section B explores the
disproportionate harm that alternative schools inflict on students
from low-income backgrounds, students with disabilities, and Black
and Brown students.
A. Recent Trends Toward Alternative Schools

The U.S. Department of Education defines an alternative school
as "[a] public elementary/secondary school that (1) addresses needs
of students that typically cannot be met in a regular school, (2) provides nontraditional education, (3) serves as an adjunct to a regular
school, or (4) falls outside the categories of regular, special education, or vocational education."48 The movement toward alternative
schools started in the 1960s as a genuine effort to help students at
risk of failing or dropping out of school. 44 Originally, alternative
schools provided academic support in an insulated environment to
encourage student success. 45 Alternative schools continued gaining
traction in the 1980s during the War on Drugs and the advent of
zero-tolerance disciplinary policies in schools. 46
Many of these policies followed the ''broken windows" theory of
criminal justice. 47 This theory insists that crime is a disorder that
leads to more frequent and more serious crime later in life if not
41. See id. at 435 ("Frequently, alternative education programs are used as 'dumping
grounds' and 'warehouses' for di.f!icult students, teachers, or administrators, creating 'secondclass citizens' in the education community." (quoting Margaret Haddeman, Alternative

Schools, TRENDS & ISSUES 6 (2002))).
42. See id. at 431.
43. Appendix B: Common Core of Data Glossary, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDvc. STAT. (Oct. 2008),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/pesschools07/glossary.asp [https://perma.cc/7HPM-8ME9].
44. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 70.
45. See Sally Reed, Whatever Happened to Alternative Schools?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11115/educationlwhatever-happened-to-alternativeschools.html [https://perma.cc/SBZ4-PSHK] (discussing the original innovative role of alternative schools and street academies for urban students struggling in traditional schools).
46. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 71.
47. See FarnelMaxim.e, Zero-Tolerance Policies and the &haal to Prison Pipeline, SHARED
JusT_ (Jan_lB, 2018), http://www_sharedjustice.org/domestiD-justicc/2017/12/21/zero-toleranrepolicies-and-the-school-to-prison-pipeline [https://perma.ccJHU6M-PBIA].
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stopped early.'" These policies encouraged schools to "crack[] down
on" minor disciplinary infractions in order to prevent serious crimes,
such as rapes, robberies, and homicides, from occurring in the future. 49 Lawmakers theorized that behavior would decrease with aggressive policing both inside and outside of schools. 50 In the 1990s,
the Department of Justice began supporting the presence oflaw enforcement officers in schools. 61 Moreover, Congress passed the GunFree Schools Act of 1994 and the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994, both of which imposed harsh zerotolerance policies in school zones. 62
By the 1996-97 school year, over 78 percent of schools surveyed
had expanded zero-tolerance drug policies to include tobacco and
alcohol on school campuses.•• Today, some schools arbitrarily take
zero-tolerance policies to the extreme. 54 For example, schools have
considered "butter knives and toy swords" as weapons, "tobacco and
over-the-counter medications like Aspirin or Midol" as drugs, and
"minor scuffles" as fighting. 55 Although each state varies in its approach to zero-tolerance policies, disciplinary alternative schools
grew in popularity as a way to manage the problematic behavior of
students in increasingly strict schools.
Strict disciplinary policies detrimentally impact the lifelong trajectory of students. 66 The number of students suspended from public
schools nearly doubled from 1.7 million in 1994 to 3.1 million by
1997. 67 Similarly, alternative school placements increased threefold
48. See id.

49. ld.
50. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 71.
51. ld.
52. See id. at 71-72 ('"Under the current Gun-Free Schools Act, every state that receives
federal funds must have a state-level policy that requires local education agencies to expel a
student for not less than a year if the student is determined to have possessed a firearm at

school. While this law allows for the chief administering officer of the local educational agency
to modify the expulsion requirement, a one-year expulsion represents the default minimum
sanction for a student." (footnotes omitted)).

53. ld. at 72.
54. See Maxime, supra note 47.
55. ld.
56. See Emily Boudreau, SclwolDiscipline Linked to Later Consequences, USABLE KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.gse.harvard.edulnews/uk/19/09/school-discipline-linked-

later-consequences#:-:text=A%20strict%20school%20climate%20negatively,as%20a%201ever

%20for%20change [https://perma.cc/U2RS-LMCB].
57. Johnson & Naughton, supm note 14, at 72.
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between the 1997-98 and 2000-01 school years, with 10,900 alternative schools disciplining 612,900 students in the 2000-01 school
year alone. 58 Twenty-nine of the thirty-nine state education departments that participated in a 2016 ProPublica survey stated that
school districts are granted the authority and discretion to involuntarily transfer students to disciplinary alternative schools.""
However, school districts and administrators should not bear the
blame alone for over-used disciplinary alternative schools. "[M]any
of the marginalization policies are not created at the school level,
but are instead the result offederal and state policies that follow the
trend toward a zero tolerance approach to education. Perceptions
about minority achievement and underclass culture affect all teachers, regardless of race." 60 An additional layer of procedural due process protections would combat the systemic racism, implicit bias,
and abuse of discretion that fuel the modern-day school discipline
crisis.

B. Disproportionate Social Harms
Strict disciplinary standards and zero-tolerance policies do not
impact students equally. Students from low-income backgrounds,
students with disabilities, and Black and Brown students are increasingly vulnerable to harsh disciplinary sentences for minor behavioral infractions compared to their affluent, able-bodied, and
white counterparts."' Much of this discrepancy can be attributed to
the high levels of discretion school administrators have over student
discipline. 62 Although alternative schools may appear enticing to
teachers desperate to rid their classrooms of misbehaving students,

58. ld.

59. Heather Vogell, How Students Get Banished to Alternative Schools, PRoPuBLICA (Dec.
6, 2017, 8:00AM), https://www .propublica.orglarticlelhow-students-get-banished-to-alterna

tive·schools [https:llperma.cc/JF3P-6EBT].
60. Geronimo, supra note 39, at 451-52 (footnote omitted).
61. See id. at 435-36.
62. See id.; Sarah D. Sparks & Alyson Klein, Discipline Disparities Grow for Students of
Color, New Federal Dota Slww, Eouc. WK. (Apr. 24, 2018), https:llwww.edweek.org/ewlarti
cles/2018/04/24/discipline-di.spari.ties-grow-for-students-of-color.html [https:l/perma.cci3VKMCMUZ].
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a disciplinary transfer can serve as a funnel into the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. 63
A 2019 Harvard study of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District in North Carolina showed that 23 percent of middle school
students are suspended each year in the district, with suspensions
concentrated heavily among Black and Brown students and students with disabilities. 64 As the study observed, schools were redistricted in 2002, and about 50 percent of all students were reassigned
to a new school. 66 From this reassignment, "[s]tudents assigned to
a school with a one standard deviation higher suspension rate
[were]15-20% more likely to be arrested and incarcerated as adults
and were also less likely to attend a four-year college." 66 This
outcome was most concentrated in male students of color and
indicated negative long-term outcomes in the potential for arrests
and incarcerations. 67
Similarly, a survey ofKentucky'sJefferson County School District
during the 1997-98 school year found that the district transferred
over 13 percent of Black third-grade students to disciplinary alternative schools but transferred only 3.8 percent of white third-grade
students. 68 Law enforcement subsequently detained 50 percent of
the district's Black students placed in a disciplinary alternative
school, compared to only 32 percent of white students.••
Both studies focused on ethnically diverse urban school districts,
which are among the largest contributors to their respective state
juvenile incarceration rates. Although the two studies analyze data
from different decades, states, and age groups, the results indicate
that the disproportionate effect on Black and Brown, disabled, and
low-income youth remains consistent. In fact, low-income students
account for 46 percent of the entire traditional public high school
population in America, yet they account for 71 percent of students
63. See Geronimo, supra note 39, at 431.
64. Boudreau, supra note 56 (studying "the relationship between suspensions,
achievement, and incarceration" at high-suspension public schools).

65. Id.
66. Id.

67. See id. ("[T]here are large negative impacts on later-life outcomes, related to attending
a school with a high suspension rate. That suggests there are not overwhelmingly positive
benefits of removing disruptive peers from the classroom.").
68. Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 74-75.

69. Id. at 75.
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in alternative schools. 70 Scholars have described the current state
of alternative schools as "nothing less than a state of crisis." 71
The public school discipline crisis is not limited to alternative
school transfers. During the 2016-17 school year, Virginia issued
over 127,800 out-of-school suspensions to over seventy-three thousand students. 72 The suspension rate for Black students was 4.5
times higher than the rate for Hispanic and white students. 78 This
rate increased from 3.8 times higher in the 2015-16 school year. 74
The Legal Aid Justice Center compared suspension rates of students
and found that Black male students with disabilities were more
than twenty times more likely to be suspended than able-bodied
white female students. 76 School suspensions and expulsions can lead
to a decreased likelihood ofhigh school graduation and post-secondary education enrollment, as well as a greater risk of entering the
criminal justice or juvenile justice systems."6 In 2015, Virginia
claimed the highest rate in the United States for referring students
to law enforcement. 77 Although Virginia continues to use exclusionary discipline practices, including disciplinary alternative schools,
the state does not release information on how many or which
students are transferred to these alternative schools; this makes
tracking, managing, and regulating the alternative school crisis
difficult. 78
70. Id. at 7 4.
71. Id. at 75 (quoting Judi Vanderhaar, Marco Munoz & Joseph Petrosko, Reconsidering
the Alternatives: The Relationship Between Suspension, Disciplinary Alternative School
Placement, Subsequent Juvenile Detention, and the Salience of Race, 6 J. APPLIED RscH. ON
CHILD. 1, 10 (2014)).
72. AMY WOOLARD, MARIO SALAs & RACHAEL DEANE, LEGAL AID JUST. CTS., SUSPENDED
PROGRESS 2018: AN UPDATE ON THE STATE OF ExCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE & ALTERNATIVE
EDUCATION IN VmGINlA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1 (2018).

73. Id.
74. ld.

76. Id. (arguing that Virginia should implement a plan to eliminate the disparities in the
use of school exclusion against Black and disabled students).
76. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 73.
77. Press Release, Legal Aid Just. Ctr., Press Statement on Investigative Report Finding
Virginia Tops Nation in Referring Schoolchildren to Police (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www .justice
4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/CPI -statement-FINAL. pdf [https://perma.cc/UVFSSUUY]. In 2015, Virginia's rate for referring students to law enforcement was nearly three
times the national rate. ld.
78. See WOOLARD ET AL., supra note 72, at 10 ("As a Commonwealth, we know almost
nothing about which or how many students are being placed into disciplinary alternative
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Research shows that "educator perspectives and practices have
consistently emerged as significant predictors of rates of referral
and disproportionality in suspension." 79 Factors such as implicit bias
in classroom management and differential administrative processing result in Black students being referred more often for discipline
and more likely to receive harsher consequences than their white
counterparts for the same infractions. 80 School administrators wield
massive amounts of discretion in effectuating school discipline. This
discretion, paired with teachers' implicit biases against Black and
Brown students and fears that they cannot control their classes,
leads to high levels of disparity among how and which students are
disciplined in schools."'
Teachers and administrators may justify the overuse of disciplinary alternative schools as an option to relieve the classroom of difficult students and uphold the zero-tolerance expectations of both
the disciplinary and criminal justice systems."2 Over-utilizing alternative schools reduces the number of students in class, improves the
student-to-teacher ratio, and may artificially boost standardized test
scores. 83 Educators' careers "may depend upon meeting these standards, and a curriculum that depends too much on testing and
accountability may create a culture where test success becomes paramount to educating students. Pushing low-performing students out
may ensure that the school will receive increased funding and/or
increase administrators' job security."84

education programs, how they perform-academically and behaviorally-after they enter the
program, and what happens to them after they leave (if they ever transfer back into their
home school, or even if they graduate).").
79. Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 73 (quoting Russell J. Skiba, Mariella I.
Arredondo, Chrystal Gray & M. Karega Rausch, What Do We Know About Discipline Disparities? New and Emerging Research, in INEQUALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: RESEARCH AND

i'RACTICE TO REDUCE DISPARlTIES 22-24 (Russell J. Skiba eta!. eds., 2016)); see also Sparks

& Klein, supra note 62 ("Anytime you have high levels of fear and high levels of discretion,
you're going to end up with high levels of disparity.").
80. Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 73.
81. See id.
82. See Geronimo, supra note 39, at 446-46 (explaining that the remaining students in
typical classrooms "receive a better education" with the use of alternative schools because of
lower student-to-teacher ratios and teachers managing lighter loads).
83. Seeid.
84. Id. at 446 (footnote omitted).
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However, these perceived benefits are an illusion created as a
result of funneling at-risk students away from better-performing
schools with adequate resources and into alternative schools. Once
in these facilities, students are isolated from their mainstream
peers and burdened with punitive policies and zero-tolerance standards.85 The low-quality and inadequate education that alternative
schools offer students often leads to higher dropout rates. 86 Students
who drop out of high school in turn face higher risks of arrest and
recidivism. 87 Thus alternative schools serve as "gateway programs
that support the mass incarceration of poor, [Black, and Brown]
youth." 88 With this background in mind, Part II considers the circuit
split on what due process protections students are entitled to before
being transferred to a disciplinary alternative school.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

In the seminal1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court held that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate.""" Although the Constitution does not guarantee a federally protected
right to education, 90 once a state grants its students a property right
and a liberty interest in education, this right is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be revoked without due process. 91 These property and liberty interests prohibit schools from
depriving a student of education through suspension or expulsion
without due process procedures, including giving notice of charges
and an opportunity for a hearing. 92 When students are suspended
or expelled, they suffer reputational harm, face risks of impaired
education and employment opportunities, and lose valuable instruction time in the classroom, all of which may adversely affect

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 457-58.
Id. at 436·37.
Id. at 452.
Id.

393 u.s. 503, 506 (1969).
San Antonio Indep. Seh. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574·75 (1975).
See id.
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the students' long-term educational trajectory. 98 This Part explains
the current circuit split over whether students facing an involuntary transfer to a disciplinary alternative school are entitled to
similar due process procedural protections as those required before
suspensions and expulsions.
A. Courts That Require Due Process for Alternative School
Transfers

Lower courts disagree on whether students that face an involuntary transfer to an alternative school are entitled to due process
protections. The Seventh Circuit and U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania consider an alternative school
transfer as serious as suspension and expulsion, thereby entitling
the student to at least a minimum level of procedural due process
protections. 94
In the Seventh Circuit case, Betts v. Board of Education, Goldie
Betts, a former Chicago high school student, alleged that the disciplinary proceeding for her involuntary transfer to the local alternative school violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Goldie, along with two other students, pulled three
fire alarms and caused the evacuation of the school. 96 Police brought
Betts to the station for questioning but did not file charges. 97 Instead, the school immediately transferred Goldie to an alternative
school to attend classes once a week. 98
The Seventh Circuit held that "it is beyond question that the
plaintiff's interest in continuing her high school education is within
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection.""" The school was required to give the plaintiff and her parents
93. See id. at 574-76.
94. Betts v. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972); Everett v. Marcase, 426 F.
Supp. 397, 400-01 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (requiring the hearing to be conducted by an impartial
party).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

466 F.2d at 630-31.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633 (citing Bd. ofRegeots of State Colis. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). The court
considered it important that Goldie had admitted to her misconduct, but held that due process
protections still apply when contemplating "the question of what discipline is warranted by
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an opportunity to "present a mitigative argument" on the issue of
what discipline was appropriate. 100 Goldie and her mother were on
notice of the charges and the severity of the potential discipline
because of the police involvement.'"' The student and her mother
received notice from the school about the upcoming discipline conference, and they were allowed to contest the transfer at this conference.102 These measures, although minimal, sufficed to satisfy
Goldie's due process protections. 103
Similarly, in Everett v. Marcase, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that schools must provide students with notice and a fair and impartial hearing before
invoking an involuntary disciplinary transfer. 104 The court compared
this case to Goss v. Lopez, which required a school to provide procedural due process protections before even temporarily suspending
a student. 105 Like suspensions, disciplinary transfers are disruptive
and serious events in the course of a child's education, and any
educational disruption results in a loss of educational opportunities.106 If anything, an involuntary transfer to a different school,
which may be further from home or offer poorer educational facilities, is more disruptive than a short suspension from school. 107
Therefore, the court held that the student could continue attending
his or her school until the school provided notice and conducted a
fair and impartial hearing authorizing the student's disciplinary
transfer. 108

the identified offense." ld. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
100. Id. (labeling her involuntary transfer to an alternative school as «tantamount to expulsion" and "discretionary rather than prescribed").

Id. at 633·34.
Id.
ld. at 634.
See 426 F. Supp. 397, 401-04 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
ld. at 400.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 403-04 A transfer prior to final hearing, where there exists no emergency
situation, would appear to violate the due process prescribed in Goss type suspensions. This
is particularly so, since in a true emergency such as potential danger of physical harm to other
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

r

classmates, suspension procedures remain available. Consequently, no transfer shall become
effective until final determination by the hearing officer that the recommendation to transfer

be approved.").
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B. Courts That Do Not Require Due Process for
Alternative School Transfers
The Seventh Circuit and Eastern District of Pennsylvania remain in the minority by granting procedural protections to students
facing involuntary transfers. The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
fail to extend due process protections for disciplinary alternative
schools. 109 These circuits contend that schools do not endanger constitutionally protected property or liberty interests by involuntarily
transferring a student to an alternative school."" The circuits distinguish alternative school transfers from suspensions or expulsions by arguing that, with a suspension or expulsion, students are
pushed out of the classroom and deprived of instructional time and
education for the duration of the discipline. 111 These courts maintain
that students transferred to an alternative school never miss instruction or coursework. 112
The Tenth Circuit held that for this reason, transferring a
student to an alternative school, even for the entire school year, is
less severe than expulsion, and therefore students are not entitled
to due process before the transfer. 113 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
held that a student is not entitled to procedural protections when involuntarily transferred to an alternative school unless the student
shows the alternative school's education program "is significantly
different from or inferior to that received at his regular public
school." 114 The court did not define what is considered "significantly
109. See Langley v. Monroe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 264 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2008);

Buchanan v. CityofBolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d

662, 670 (lOth Cir. 1981).
110. E.g., Langley, 264 F. App'x at 368; Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist.,
111 F.3d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1997).
111. See, e.g., Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26 ("Timothy Nevares is not being denied access to

public education, not even temporarily. He was only to be transferred from one school program to another program with stricter discipline. This alternative program is maintained by
Texas schools for those students whose violations of the law or the school's code of conduct fall
short of triggering suspension or expulsion, but who for reasons of safety and order must be
removed from the regular classroom.").
112. E.g., id. This rationale assumes that the student will receive similar instruction,

coursework, and education regardless of whether the student attends an alternative school
or a traditional school. See id.
113. Zamora, 639 F.2d at 670.
114. Buchanan, 99 F.3d at 1359.
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different from or inferior to" and left this issue up for later judicial
interpretation in lower courts. 115
Ill. GOSS V. LOPEZ AS A VEHICLE FOR GREATER
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS

In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court determined that, while
students are not entitled to the full spectrum of due process protections in matters of school discipline, they do possess a constitutionally protected property right and liberty interest in their
education. 116 In this case, nine students each alleged that the school
administrators violated their right to due process by suspending
them from their Ohio public high school for up to ten days without
a hearing. 117 The Court developed a two-part test to determine
whether due process applies to the students' discipline infractions.""
First, a court must look at the nature of the interest deprived. 119 If
the nature of the interest is a constitutionally protected one, then
due process protections apply. 120 Second, a court must consider the
weight of the protected interests to determine how much and what
process is appropriate.'"' This determination involves balancing
the school's interest in efficiency and disciplinary autonomy against
the student's interest in their education.'""
Mter implementing this balancing test, the Court created a
bright-line rule for disciplinary matters involving suspension or expulsion.123 With a suspension of ten days or less, the student must
at least receive oral or written notice of the charges against him or
her, an explanation of the evidence that the authorities have, and
115. Seeid.
116. See 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that students do not have a fundamental constitutional right to ao

education but that state constitutions and statutes have provided students with a protectable
property and liberty interest in attending school, which the Court seeks to minimally protect).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 568.
See id. at 575·78.
Id. at 575·76.
See id.
See id. at 577-78.
122. See id. at 577-82. Due process protections may span anywhere from notice and an
informal hearing to a formal hearing with an impartial third party. See id. at 579, 581-82.
123. See id. at 584.

2108

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2091

an opportunity to informally present his or her side of the story. 124
Longer suspensions may receive more formal procedures. 125 Due
process protections do not shield a student from properly imposed
suspensions; however, unwarranted suspensions disserve both the
state's and student's interests. 126
This Part argues that the Court should extend the reasoning in
Goss to alternative school transfers to protect students' property interest in their education and liberty interest in their reputation. The
first Section uses the history of alternative schools to demonstrate
that when the Court first issued the Goss holding, the landscape of
disciplinary alternative schools appeared much different. Given the
current popularity of alternative schools, the Court should expand
this holding beyond suspensions and expulsions to accomplish the
Court's original goal. The second Section argues that extending the
Goss holding provides students with greater due process protections
and could mitigate the social disparities and disproportionate impact of alternative schools.
A. Evaluating the Goss Holding in a Modern Education Context

The Court decided Goss in 1975. 127 At that time, school districts
used alternative schools in a rehabilitative manner to help students at risk of failing or dropping out of school. 128 Districts did
not start using alternative schools for punishment or behavior management until the War on Drugs and the Gun-Free Schools Act
gained traction in the late twentieth century, fostering a movement
of zero-tolerance disciplinary standards. 129 Thus, when the Court
first evaluated the constitutionally protected due process rights of
students in disciplinary proceedings, the issue and dangers of
disciplinary alternative schools were not yet relevant. The Court
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

ld. at 581.
See id. at 584.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 565.

See TEx. EDUC.AGENCY, DISCIPLINARY ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAM PRACTICES

1 (2007), https1/tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/Spec..PRR_l7_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ
3T-U5BF]; Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 70-71.
129. See Johnson & Naughton, supra note 14, at 71-72; TEX. Eouc.A.GENCY, supra note 128,
at 1-2; Geronimo, supra note 39, at 434.
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focused on suspensions and expulsions because those were the punishments most often administered by school officials. 130
The Goss Court's reasoning and two-part analysis should apply to
the modern use of alternative schools. To extend its holding to alternative schools, the Court would first consider the nature of the
interest deprived. 131 While some circuits hold that students' educational and liberty interests are not implicated in alternative school
transfers, 132 these courts ignore the fundamental differences between traditional public schools and alternative schools. Alternative
school transfers endanger students' property interest in their education and liberty interest in their reputation.
As previously discussed, there is a staggering difference in students' educational experiences and trajectories between traditional
schools and alternative schools. 133 Unlike traditional schools, alternative schools typically do not assign homework or offer libraries,
cafeterias, gyms, sports, or clubs. 184 At J .R.'s alternative school, over
90 percent of students fell below grade-level competency in math,
and not a single student made it to senior year. 135 The teachers responsible for her education "averaged only 0. 94 years of experience
compared to teachers in other local alternative schools, who averaged 19.07 years and 10.58 years, respectively." 136
It is impossible to reconcile these statistics with the notion that
students receive a similar educational experience, whether in a traditional school or an alternative school. Disciplinary alternative
schools provide lower quality education and fewer resources to students, resulting in significantly lower test scores and graduation
rates than their other public school counterparts. 137 The Court must
consider the effects of school discipline holistically and acknowledge
that, like suspensions and expulsions, alternative schools implicate
130. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 567 n.l.
131. See id. at 575-76.
132. See generally Nevaxes v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25 (5th Cir.
1997); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (lOth Cir.l981); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d
1352 (6th Cir. 1996).
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. See ACLU, Press Release, supra note 16.
135. ld.
136. ld.
137. See Geronimo, supm note 39, at 452.

2110

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2091

students' educational property and reputational liberty interests,
thereby requiring procedural due process protections.
Next, in determining the appropriate due process needed for an
alternative school transfer, the Court would evaluate the weight of
the student's interest in their education and reputation against the
school's interest. 138 Because students' property and liberty interests
are implicated in a manner similar to suspensions and expulsions, 189
the Court should hold that students are entitled to minimum due
process protections comparable to those required for suspensions
and expulsions. Providing students with oral or written notice of
the charges against them, an explanation of the evidence that the
authorities have, and the opportunity to informally present their
side of the story would shield students from unreasonable, inappropriate, and unwarranted alternative school transfers. 140 Just as the
Court held for suspensions and expulsions, longer transfers to alternative schools may require additional procedures. 141
B. Mitigating the Disproportionate Impact of Alternative Schools

In Goss, the Court attempted to prevent schools from temporarily
depriving students of their educational property and liberty interests without due process procedures. 142 By failing to extend this
holding to dangerous and low-performing disciplinary alternative
schools, the Court abandons the central principles of Goss and
leaves students vulnerable to unfair disciplinary standards. 148
Disciplinary alternative schools are not comparable to their public
school counterparts in quality, opportunity, or safety. 144 Statistics
show that students who attend alternative schools receive a subpar
educational experience and suffer a greater risk of criminal justice
or juvenile court involvement. 145

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-79 (1975).
Seeid.
See id. at 581.
See id. at 584.
See id. at 579-81.
See Geronimo, supra note 39, at 430-31.

See id. at 434-36.
See id. at 430, 436-38.
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Furthermore, like the Court considered in Goss, an alternative
school transfer may damage students' reputations and interfere
with their future educational and employment opportunities. 146
When public schools transfer students to an alternative school,
administrators document these transfers in the students' permanent
school records. 147 As a part of the permanent record, alternative
school involvement is reported to all future community colleges, universities, or military programs that students pursue. 148 Like records
of suspensions and expulsions, alternative school notations follow
students into adulthood and damage their reputations in future
endeavors. 149
The Goss Court granted students due process protections for their
education to prevent unwarranted discipline and harm to their reputation.150 The Court's considerations and concerns directly apply to
involuntary transfers to disciplinary alternative schools. By failing
to update the Goss holding to extend beyond suspensions and expulsions, the Court ignores the holding's overarching goal of unwarranted discipline and leaves students' constitutionally protected
interests vulnerable.
Moreover, the reality of unwarranted discipline does not endanger
all students equally. Black and Brown students, students with
disabilities, and students from low-income backgrounds disproportionately suffer from unwarranted and unfair discipline. 151 By
expanding due process to encompass involuntary transfers to
disciplinary alternative schools, the Court would provide a layer of
procedural protections to those students most vulnerable to entering
the school-to-prison pipeline. For example, if the Court expanded
the Goss holding to apply to alternative school transfers, Atlanta
Public Schools would have had to provide prior notice and an
informal hearing before involuntarily transferring J.R. to Forrest

146. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574·75.
147. See Protecting the Privacy of Student Education Records, NAT'L CTR. FOR Enuc. STAT.
(Mar. 1997), https:llnces.ed.govlpubs97/web/97859.asp [https:llperma.cc/F3GZ·9U9B].
148. See Know Your Rights: School Discipline, ACLU OF R.I., https:llwww.riaclu.org/en/
know-your-rights/know-your-rights-school-discipline [https:llperma.cc/LGC3-JB4R].
149. See id.
150. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
151. See Geronimo, supm note 39, at 435.
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Hill Academy.'" This notice and hearing would not prevent a fair
and justified discipline sentence to an alternative school. 153 However, the procedural protections would offer J.R., and the hundreds
of other students in a similar situation, a layer of protection that
forces schools to thoughtfully consider and support their decision
to transfer a student.
IV.COUNTERARGUMENTS

While expanding due process protections to alternative school
transfers would provide a vital layer of procedural protection to
students, the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits hold that the protections are unnecessary because such transfers do not deprive students of their access to a public education. 154 Other critics argue that
expanding due process protections places a financial burden on
struggling school districts. 155 Finally, some school advocates argue
that requiring due process procedures infringes on school administrators' discretion in disciplinary matters. 156 However, current data
on alternative schools refutes these arguments and suggests that
the Court should adopt expanded due process protections, such as
those employed by the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
A. Alternative Schools Provide Similar Educational Opportunities

Circuits that refuse to provide procedural protections to students
facing involuntary disciplinary transfers fail to acknowledge the extensive data that demonstrates the vast difference between disciplinary alternative schools and traditional public schools. Students
from low-income backgrounds, students with disabilities, and Black
152. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 581 (granting minimum due process protections to all students
facing suspension or expulsion).
153. Cf. id. at 579.
154. See Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997);

Langley v. Monroe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 264 F. App'x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2008); Buchanan v. City
of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1996); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (lOth
Cir. 1981).
155. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.
156. See id. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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and Brown students remain extremely vulnerable to alternative
school transfers, and parents are left with no assurance of due
process to protect their students' constitutional interests. 167 The
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits reason that students are not deprived of "access to public education, not even temporarily," when
transferred from traditional public school to an alternative school
with harsher discipline standards. 168 This reasoning fails to acknowledge the extent and severity of such increased discipline.
Students transferred to disciplinary alternative schools face lower
graduation rates and higher involvement with the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. 159 A transfer to a disciplinary alternative
school removes students from their familiar and less restrictive
school environment and places them in a harsher environment
with fewer resources. 160 This educational, social, and environmental change monumentally shifts the trajectory of students most vulnerable to dropping out of school or entering the criminal justice
system. 161
The disproportionate and dangerous effect of alternative schools
on vulnerable students hardly accomplishes the Supreme Court's
due process goals in education as expressed in Goss. 162 The Court's
reasoning that unwarranted suspensions and expulsions harm
both the student's and state's interests directly translates to the
harm that occurs from unwarranted alternative school transfers. 163
Therefore, the Court must apply similar due process protections to
prevent frivolous and unwarranted transfers that will inevitably
endanger a student's property and liberty interests. 164
157. See WOOLARD ET AL., supra note 72, at 1.
158. See Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26; Langley, 264 F. App'x: at 368; Zamora, 639 F.2d at 670;
Buch<lnan, 99 F.3d at 1359.
159. See Geronimo, supra note 39, at 431.
160. See Vogell, supra note 59 ("There is an enormous change in the quality of education
that the student has a shot at when they're moved from regular school to alternative school.j.

161. See id.
162. See iti.; (]Qas v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (seeking to provide a layex of protection to students that acknowledges their constitutional rights and prevents unwarranted suspensions and expulsions).
163. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579.
164. See Meredith S. Simons, Note, Giving Vulnerable Students Their Due: Implementing
Due Process Protections for Students Referred from Schools to the Justice System, 66 DUKEL.J.
943, 969 (2017) (applying a similar argument to students facing referrals to the criminal
justice system without due process).
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B. Requiring Due Process Infringes on School Administrators'
Discretion
Courts value providing school administrators with discretion in
disciplinary decisions. 165 In his Goss dissent, Justice Powell argued
that requiring due process protections limits the disciplinary discretion that school administrators may employ on a case-by-case
basis and that this constraint will "affect adversely the quality of
education."166 The judiciary serves a limited role in the supervision
of public schools, and increasing due process protections could be
perceived as a judicial overreach. 167
This criticism correctly identifies school administrators as the
experts "in the daily operation of public schools." 168 However, by
expanding the holding in Goss, the Court would not infringe on
school administrators' discretion or interest in order and discipline.
Expanding the two-part test and holding from Goss merely extends
minimal constitutional protections to students before their education, reputation, and future trajectory are negatively and irrevocably disrupted. 169 The expanded due process protections do not limit
the school administrators' range of discipline options. Instead, administrators would simply have to provide oral or written notice of
the charges brought against the student, an explanation of the evidence that the authorities have, and the opportunity for students to
informally present their side. 17° Following Goss, administrators

165. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 584 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that the disciplinarian's
"discretion will be more informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced").
166. Id. at 585 r'The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than
educational officials and state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules ap-

plicable to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools.").
167. See id. at 690 ("Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate

basic constitutional values." (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).
168. See id. at 589-90.
169. See id. at 579 (majority opinion) (accomplishing this goal for suspensions and
expulsions).
170. See id. at 583-84 ("[T]he disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes
about facts and arguments about cause and effect. He may then determine himself to summon
the accuser, permit cross-examination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses.
In more difficult cases, he may permit counsel.").
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already provide students with these protections before suspending
or expelling a student. 171
Creating a step that requires schools to explain the charges and
evidence and allows the student to refute accusations would help
prevent frivolous and unwarranted discipline that occurs as a result
of a misunderstanding or extenuating circumstance. 172 Furthermore,
requiring schools to articulate this information to students and
parents keeps schools accountable for their disciplinary decisions. 173
As the majority reasoned in Goss, the protections serve both the
student's and the school's interests in preventing unwarranted
transfers to alternative schools. 174 This updated interpretation of
Goss is consistent with the spirit and goal of the Court's original
holding and provides protection consistent with modern-day school
discipline.
C. Due Process Is Cost-Prohibitive for Schools
Some critics argue that formalizing the discipline process will
result in due process procedures that are too costly for schools to effectivelyimplement.175 The Court first addressed this concern fortysix years ago in Goss by weighing the potential burden on the school
against the student's constitutionally protected liberties. 176 As a
result, the Court extended only minimal due process protections,
including effective notice and an informal hearing, to students
facing short suspensions. 177 The protections struck a balance, only
mandating procedures that would protect the student's constitutional rights without making the punishment too costly to serve as
a "regular disciplinary tool." 178 While greater disciplinary sentences
may warrant a formal hearing, the Court held that effective notice
and an informal hearing would "provide a meaningful hedge against

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id.
See id. at 579·80.
See id.
See id. at 579.
See, e.g., id. at 583.
See id.
See id. at 584.
Id. at 583.
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erroneous action" in school discipline, thereby achieving the Court's
goal of protecting student liberties. 179
The considerations in Goss directly mirror those in cases involving transfers to disciplinary alternative schools. Providing students
with oral or written notice, an explanation of evidence, and the op·
portunity for an informal hearing creates a layer of protection that
requires schools to notify parents and justify their discipline decisions before transferring a student. 180 Statistics show that once
transferred, students face serious consequences, including reputational damage, lower-quality education, and lower disciplinary
thresholds that directly lead to higher rates of involvement with the
justice system. 181 This indicates that the same constitutionally
protected liberties in Goss that are endangered by unwarranted
suspensions and expulsions are also endangered by unwarranted
transfers to alternative schools.
Furthermore, public schools have successfully provided these
procedural protections for the last forty-six years before suspending
or expelling a student. 182 The processes, infrastructure, and administrative support needed to provide due process in disciplinary matters already exist in public schools nationwide. 183 Extending this
requirement to protect students facing alternative school transfers
would not create a significant burden or change in school administration.•••
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by expanding
its holding in Goss v. Lopez to protect students facing involuntary
transfers to disciplinary alternative schools. The Court issued this
holding to prevent schools from temporarily depriving students of
their educational property and liberty interests by suspending or
expelling students without the minimum due process procedures of
notice and an informal hearing.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
See id.
See supra Part I.B.
See generally Goss, 419 U.S. at 565.
See id. at 582-83 (mandating these protections in 1975).
Seeid.
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Like suspensions and expulsions prior to Goss, modern-day alternative school transfers unjustly deprive students of their property
and liberty interests in their education without due process protection. These transfers disproportionately affect students from lowincome backgrounds, students with disabilities, and Black and
Brown students. With involuntary alternative school transfers, students face similar or more severe reputational and educational
harms as they do with suspensions and expulsions. Therefore, by
failing to extend previously established constitutional protections to
modern-day school discipline tactics, the Court fails to achieve its
original goal as explained in Goss.
Students should have the same due process procedural protections before a school may deprive them of the property interest
in their education. These protections include requiring schools to
provide oral or written parental notice, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have, and an opportunity for the student to
present his or her side before a school may involuntarily transfer
the student to a disciplinary alternative school. Both the Seventh
Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania have successfully expanded these minimum due process procedural protections to include alternative school transfers. 185
Furthermore, this due process expansion utilizes disciplinary
standards and procedures already in place in schools and required
by Goss for suspensions and expulsions. The procedures balance
both schools' and students' interests without encroaching on school
administrators' discretion over discipline. Thus, by extending the
due process protections of Goss v. Lopez to disciplinary alternative
school transfers, the Court would achieve its ultimate goal of

185. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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preventing unwarranted school discipline in a modern-day context.
This extension is a small but vital step toward diverting J.R., and
the thousands of other marginalized youth nationwide, away from
the school-to-prison pipeline and into a brighter future.
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